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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action involving the revocation of the 
Plaintiff's license to practice medicine as an osteopathic 
physician and surgeon, by the Department of Registration. The 
revocation order was entered by the Department of Registration 
on February 2, 1981, at the conclusion of a hearing before the 
Osteopathic Commit tee. The commit tee recommended revocation of 
Dr. Vance's license, for "unprofessional· conduct" under Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 § 58-12-36(15). 
The decision was appealed to the District Court~ of 
Salt Lake County under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 § 58-1-36 by filing an "action" as provided. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court treated the appeal simply as a 
review, ordered the parties to file appeal briefs, and based 
upon a review of the transcript of hearing before the 
Osteopathic Committee, and the parties brief's, the District 
Court affirmed the order of the Department of Registration, 
concluding that "This Court may not substitute its judgment of 
factual matters for that of the fact finding body unless that 
body has acted capriciously or arbitrarily, or unless its 
conclusions are unsupported by the evidence." 
Further, prior to the final ruling, the Plaintiff had 
discovered that one of the three member Osteopathic Committee 
was disqualified and barred from serving thereon under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 58-1-6. A motion to 
-1-
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dismiss was immediately filed with the District Court and the 
Court ruled that although the member was disqualified, she was a 
de facto officer acting under color of law, and even if the 
decision was voidable, because of the lack of qualification of 
one committee member, the point was raised for the first time on 
appeal, and is therefore untimely. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks the reversal of the revocation 
order and to have the Plaintiff's license to practice medicine 
restored as a matter of law, or in the alternative to have the 
matter remanded for a trial before the District Court. 
ST-ATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter is an appeal from an order entered 
February 2, 1981, by the Department of Registration revoking the 
professional 1 icense of the Plaintiff, Dr. Robert B. Vance, to 
practice medicine as an osteopathic physician and surgeon. The 
order was made pursuant to the recommendation of the three 
member Osteopathic Committee appointed pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 58-1-5 and 6. 
The Department of Registration originally filed a 
Complaint against the Plaintiff, alleging acts of unprofessional 
conduct in regard to 35 of the more than 8000 patients the 
Plaintiff has successfully treated over the past ten years of 
his practice. [Record p. 173-189] Included in the 35 patients 
were three "bogus" patients who were sent to the Doctor, one by 
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a local television station, to obtain chelati6n treatments, and 
who admittedly falsefied her medical history to the Doctor to 
obtain said treatment. Of the 35 patients included in the 
Complaint, many refused to testify against the Plaintiff, and 
the committee received evidence on only 9, and made adverse 
findings on only 8 of the patients, including the three "non 
patients." 
Dr. Robert B. Vance has a distinguished professional 
background, nationally recognized in the field of Preventative 
Medicine. He obtained a B.S. Degree with a major in 
Biochemistry from Beloit College, Beloit, Wisconsin in 1954. He 
then studied at the prestigious Kirksville College of 
Osteopathic Medicine in Kirkville, Missouri graduating in June 
1958. He then completed a full time rotating. internship 
averaging 92 hours per week on duty at the Bay Osteopathic 
Hospital, Bay City, Michigan. He is licensed in the States of 
Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Missouri and Utah. 
In 1961 he commenced his full time practice in the 
State of Utah, where he has continuously practiced medicine on a 
full time basis during the past 21 years, placing great emphasis 
in his practice upon preventative medicine and nutrition in the 
care and treatment of his patients. [Record p. 981-983] Over 
the period of 20 years the Doctor has dedicated literally 
hundreds of hours to research and study with many of the leading 
practitioners and pioneers in the field of medicine [Record p. 
984-989] averaging 8-10 medical conventions and seminars each 
year to advance his medical knowledge and ability in order to 
-3-
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bring aid and comfort to suffering patients. The Doctor 
testified that any of the modalities or therapies included in 
his practice have been studied by him for a minimum of three 
years. [Record p. 906] Among many of his distinguished 
accomplishments, he has been certified by the American Academy 
of Medical Preventics, as a Diplomate in Chelation Therapy. 
[Record p. 1171] 
In spite of the specialized, exhaustive and extensive 
studies and training, the record reveals an overt bias and 
prejudice on the part of the three osteopaths below as to the 
modalities employed by Dr. Vance. 
The three members of the Osteopathic Committee 
consisted of the following: Dr. Katherine V. Greenwood, Dr. 
Leland W. Shafer and Dr. Kago Hase. 
It is admitted, that Dr. Greenwood was unqualified to 
$it as a member of the Osteopathic Committee. She was sworn in 
a member of the committee on January 5, 1981, the first day of 
the hearing herein. [Record p. 139] However she was first 
licensed to practice in Utah on June 6, 1978, some two years and 
7 months before her appointment to the committee (Statute 
requires 5 years). [Record p. 140] At the date of her 
application for licensing on April 19, 1978 she was a resident 
of Iowa (Statute requires 3 years residency). [Record p. 
141-142] The knowledge of her disqualification was learned by 
Plaintiff for the first time during the appeal. 
The committee held hearings in Salt Lake County, based 
upon the petition of the Department of Registration. Of the 35 
-4-
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patients regarding whom Complaints were made, findings were made 
on only 8 of these former patients, involving the charge that 
Dr. Vance improperly diagnosed and treated these patients for 
conditions that did not exist; or used procedures or methods not 
accepted by the standards of the profession; or that he failed 
to follow the standards of the profession; and specifically 
concluding that the use of Chelation Therapy, or the prescribing 
of Laetrile (Amygdalin B-17), or the use o~ Kinesiology to test 
for food alergies, are unacceptable methods of practice by 
"medical standards". [Record p. 170-172] 
The findings were supported by hearsay testimony of 
the former patients and three MD's and one D.0. who testified as 
to their findings in treatment of the patients. However three 
noted physici~ns testified that the methods of practice used by 
Dr. Vance although not used in the mainstream of MD's in 
practice today, are clearly accepted methods of treatment and 
widely used throughout the United States today by hundreds of 
Doctors who are involved in preventative medicine. [Record p. 
Dr. Gordon p. 623-793; Dr. Halstead p. 1110-1174, Dr. Gerber p. 
1007-1104] 
Nevertheless, the Committee recommended revocation, 
and based thereon the Department of Registration issued the 
revocation order on February 6, 1981. [Record p. 169] 
The Plaintiff then filed its appeal action in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. During the pendency of the 
appeal, the Plaintiff discovered the fact that Dr. Greenwood, 
one of the three osteopaths who served on the commit tee, was 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unqualified to serve as a member, as provided by the statute. 
Plaintiff immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the 
grounds that the committee was never duly constituted under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 58-1-5 and 6 [Record p. 
79] and its decision must therefore be void. 
After arguments to the Court, the Court denied 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, concluding that although Dr. 
Greenwood was disqualified to be appointed/ she was a de facto 
officer, that even without Dr. Greenwood's vote, a majority of 
the commit tee ( 2) recommended the revocation; and even if the 
decision were voidable, Appellant's motion was not timely 
because it was raised for the first time on appeal. [Record p. 
127, 147-148] 
The Court thereafter ordered the parties to file 
briefs informing them that the decision would be made based upon 
the briefs and the transcript of the hearing before the 
committee. Based thereon, the District Court affirmed the 
revocation of the Plaintiff's license. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE WAS N.EVER DULY CONSTITUTED AND 
THEREFORE LACKED JURISDICTION TO ACT 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, the Department of 
Registration is a duly recognized administrative "agency" as 
defined in Utah Code Annotated 1953 §63-46-3(1), authorized to 
adjudicate, and grant or withhold licenses. It is basic law 
-6-
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that as a creature of statute this agency has only such power as 
is specifically defined by the statutes granting the Department 
licensing or revocation powers, and Courts will not interfere 
with the decisions of an administrative tribunal unless it 
appears that it acted in excess of its powers. See Central Bank 
and Trust v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P2d 638 (1972) 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that in 
proceedings before an administrative tribunal it is requisite 
primarily that a party must be given the opportunity to have 
notice, an opportunity to be heard and defend, in an orderly 
proceeding adapted to the nature of the case, before a tribunal 
having jurisdiction of the cause. See Empire Electric Assn. v. 
Public Service Comm. 604 P2d 930 (Utah 1979) 
The Osteopathic Committee is authorized under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 58-1-5 which provides 
as follows: 
The functions of the Department of 
Registration shall be exercised by the 
director of registration under the super-
vision of the commission of the Department of 
Business Regulations, and when so provided, 
with the collaboration and assistance of 
representative committees of the several 
professions, trades and occupations as 
follows: 
(13) For osteopathic physicians and 
surgeons, a commit tee of THREE members each 
of whom shall be a graduate of a chartered 
college of osteopathy of recognized standing. 
(Emphasis added) 
The qualifications of the THREE committee members is 
defined in Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 58-1-6 as follows: 
... Each member of a committee MUST HAVE 
had a license to practice in this state for a 
period of FIVE YEARS immediatley prior to his 
-7-
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appointment and be in 
profession, trade or 
appointed. . •. 
good standing in the 
occupation for which 
••. each member SHALL HAVE been a 
resident for a period of three years, and 
shall be domciled within the State of Utah. 
[Emphasis added] 
Dr. Katherine V. Greenwood, one of the three members 
of the osteopathic committee which heard the evidence and 
recommended the revocation, was disqualified and barred from 
acting as a committee member. Dr. Greenwood was 1 icensed to 
practice in Utah on June 6, 1978 [Record p. 140] just 2 years 
and 7 months prior to her purported appointment to the committee 
on January 5, 1981. [Record p. 139] At the time of her 
application for licensing, on ~pril 19, 1978, she was a resident 
of Bettendorf, Iowa. [Record p. 141] 
The language of the statute creating the committee is 
mandatory language, which cannot be altered by the act of the 
director of registration, nor by a ruling of the District Court 
by calling her a de facto officer. 
There is no provision in Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Title 58 Chapter 1 for any other number in the committee but 
THREE, and unless the legislature provides otherwise, a 
committee of two qualified members and 1 disqualified Doctor 
does not constitute the statutory committee, and being an 
administrative tribunal can only be vested with the power as 
specifically granted by the act creating it. In re Whitmer, in 
and for Salt Lake County, 515 P2d 617, 30 Ut 2d 206 91973) 
Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and their power 
is totally dependent upon statutes, so they must find within the 
-8-
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statute, warrant for the exercise of any authority which they 
claim. 
The general law regarding the effect of the partici-
pation in the determination by· one disqualified member is 
discussed in 1 American Jurisprudence § 69 p. 864 as follows: 
Participation in a determination by one 
disqualified member of a tribunal of three 
affects the action of the whole body. It is 
generally held that if a disqualified member 
of an administrative agency participates in 
the hearing and determination it makes the 
decision void or voidable at the instance of 
a party aggrieved who has made timely 
protest, even though his presence was not 
required to constitute a quorum, or a 
majority of the board could have acted 
legally without him. 
A determination made or participated in 
by a disqualified officer is merely voidable 
where only the common law rule as to 
disqualification is violated and proceeding 
is reviewable, but if ~tici2ation by a 
£i~s~~li!i~£_£!f i£~£_i~_£££hi£i!~£~£~ 
statute, the determination is void! TEffiPtiasrs-aadeaT _____________________ _ 
See also Stahl v. Ringgold County, 187 Iowa 1342, 175 
NW 772, 11 ALR 185, (1964) In re Weston Benefit Assessment 
Special Road District, 294 SW 2d 353 (Mo App 1956) 
In this matter, the participation of the disqualified 
member is clearly prohibited by statute and accordingly their 
determination is void, and jurisdiction never vested in the 
committee. 
POINT II 
REVOCATION OF APPELLANTS LICENSE BY THE PURPORTED COMMITTEE 
CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
Although the Supreme Court of Utah has made clear that 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the granting of a professional license is a privilege under Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 § 58-1-1.1 or § 58-12-27, and as ernunicated 
in State v. Hoffman, 558 P2d 602 (Utah 1976}, nevertheless the 
~ourts have uniformly held, that once the license is granted, it 
is a "property right" in the sense that a Board may not deprive 
the holder of the license, without satisfying the requirements 
of "due process". See Cross v. Colorado State Board of Dental 
Examiners, 552 P2d 38, 37 Colo App. 504 (1966}; State Board of 
Registration for Professional Engineers v. Antonio, 409 P2d 505, 
159 Colo 51 ( 1965}. The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized 
that a license is entitled to the safeguards of due process. 
See: Athay v. State Department of Business Regulations, 626 P2d 
965 (Utah 1981); In re Gudmundson, 556 P2d 212 (Utah 1976). 
This Court has made clear that the essentials of due 
process are 
"1} the existence of an appropriate 
tribunal 2} inquiry into the merits of the 
question presented; 3} notice of the purpose 
of the inquiry; 4} opportunity to appear in 
person or by counsel; 5) fair opportunity to 
be heard; and 6} judgment rendered in the 
record thus made." State of Utah in re LGW; 
Utah Supreme Court, Dec No. 17689 ( Nov. 3, 
1981} 
See also Cuddy v. State Department of Public Asst., 
442 P2d 617, 74 Wash 2d 17 ( 1969}; Dodds v. Ward 418 P2d 629 
(Okla 1966) 
In spite of those safeguards, the Plaintiff herein was 
judged by a committee which was not authorized under the laws of 
Utah and to allow the deprivation of his license to practice 
medicine, to be accomplished by that committee in violation of 
-10-
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Title 58 safeguards, is a denial of due process under the 
constitution. 
It is not enough to reason that the remaining two 
memebers voted for the revocation and they constitute a majority 
of the committee. In the case of Board of Medical Examiners v. 
Steward, 102 A 2d 248 (Ct. of app MD 1954), a Doctors license 
revocation was reversed because the three member medical board 
was improperly constituted, a substitute~ without statutory 
authority, having been appointed. There the attorney general 
argued that since a majority could revoke and· the vote was 
unanimous, the law was gratified. The Circuit Court ruled that 
the Doctor was entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a 
legally constituted board and the board was not legally 
const~tuted when it heard the complaint. 
Participation of the disqualified member would 
obviously taint the decision of the board. Dr. Greenwood was 
not a passive member of the board. She became an active 
interrogator on the board, even making her own statements of 
what the medical standards of the profession consist of. 
[Record p. p. 833-837 and 1094-1109] There is no way one could 
conclude by examining the record, that the decision was not 
tainted by this disqualified Doctor's participation therein. 
POINT III 
THE COMMITTEE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AS 
REQUIRED BY STATUTE 
The committee further failed to publish any standards 
-11-
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to give notice to the Plaintiff as to what conduct is 
prohibited. Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 58-1-13 provides: 
"The following functions and duties 
shall be exercised or performed by the 
department of registration, but only upon the 
action and report in writing of the 
appropriate representative committee: 
•.• 16) Defining unprofessional conduct, 
except as herein otherwise provided 
( 7) Promulgating and enforcing such 
rules and regulations as may be advocated yb 
the representative committee of the several 
professions, trades and occupations for the 
protection or best interest of the public ..• " 
Neither the Osteopathic Committee nor the department 
of registration have at any time published any standards of 
conduct for osteopaths. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
committee made the following finding: [Record p. 170] 
1. We find that osteopathic physicians 
and surgeons should maintain and uphold the 
same standards of care as medical doctors in 
caiing for and treating their patients. When 
a physician assumes primary care of a patient 
by advising a patient to discontinue medica-
tions or instructions from a previous physi-
cian, the new physician should do a complete 
physical examination and record such. The 
physical examination should include at least 
examination of heart, lungs and abdomen. No 
intravenous solutions should be given without 
a physical examination (including heart and 
lungs) being performed. We also find that a 
physician must be in attendance when intra-
venous solutions are given unless it is an 
emergency. We find that Robert B. Vance did 
not abide by and follow these standards in 
his treatment of patients and in particular 
in his care and treatment of James Nickeson. 
These standards were never established by the 
committee prior to the hearing, and in fact most were statements 
given to the committee by Dr. Katherine Greenwood, the 
disqualified board member, during the hearing, [Record p. 
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833-837 and p. 1094-1109] as her opinion of medical standards 
without supporting testimony of medical witnesses. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Tuma v. Board 
of Nursing, 593 P2d 711, 100 Ida 74 (1979) reversed the 
revocation of a professional license concluding that the board 
cannot suspend a license for unprofessional conduct by merely 
hearing evidence of licensee's conduct and then concluding that 
it was unprofessional, but that the boarq. must first publish 
rules and regulations to warn the licensee of the prohibited 
conduct. 
If the Department had even stated in the complaint, 
what standards of care the committee had established and the 
conduct Dr. Vance was being charged with as being 
"unprofessional", then in the presentation of his case, the 
Plaintiff could have known that he must present evidence 
regarding the giving of "physical exams", and "at least 
examination of the heart and lungs" as well as whether or not he 
was "in attendance when intravaneous solutions are given", and 
whether intravaneous solutions were given without a physical 
examination being performed. These violations of the standards 
of care were for the first time published and their violation 
charged against the Doctor in the committee's Findings of Fact; 
at the Conclusion of the hearing. [Record p. 170) 
As the Court in Tuma, supra at p. 717 concluded: 
"It is important ·to note also that the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine is two-pronged. 
not only are those whose activities are 
proscribed entitled to definite standards by 
which they may be guided, but it is equally 
important that the standards are there to 
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guide those officers or agencies required to 
pass judgment on licensees called to account 
for their conduct." 
In Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 19 P. 237, 239 
(1888), the Court expressed concern over the possibility that an 
individual might lose substantial rights "for the violation of 
any vague, undefined notion of unprofessional conduct which 
might, after the fact, be enteretained by certain individuals 
constituting a board of examiners." (Emphasis added.) To which 
must be added that the membership of the Committee is a changing 
thing, and as the Committee make-up changes, it cannot be said 
that notions of unprofessional conduct may not also change. 
There must be standards against which conduct can be uniformly 
judged by Courts and administrative agencies. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Arizona State Board 
of Medical Examiners v. Clark, 97 Ariz. 205, 214, 398 P. 2d 908, 
915 (1965), stated as follows: 
"As applied in the licensing and revoca-
tion cases 'unprofessional conduct' has been 
construed to include serious offense, such as 
intentional violations of law or recognized 
professional standards •... " 
"There must be a 'conscious and culpable 
act amounting to a willful design to do that 
which is denounced as a unlawful professional 
practice." 
In Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 
605 P. 2d 273, (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1980), the Supreme Court of Oregon 
similarly held, with respect to a dentist's license to practice 
dentistry, that the conduct of a dentist did not constitute a 
legal ground on which to revoke his license since the Board of 
Dental Examiners had made no rule to proscrib~ his conduct. The 
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Court further held that expert testimony is not the proper 
source for determining the governing standards of unprofessional 
conduct. A board may not p~oceed on the assumption that all 
members of the profession should be expected to share unarticu-
lated understandings about professional manners and mores. 
This latter factor is particularly true in light of 
the fact that the judgment of one physician might differ from 
that of another physician in respect to the course of treatment 
to be followed. Dickinson v. Mason, 423 P. 2d 663 (Sup. Ct. 
Utah 1967). 
The lace of identifiable standards herein is fatal to 
the charge of unprofessional conduct, where, as here, the 
appropriate application of the modalities involved are subject 
to a lack of consensus among medical experts. In such a case, 
the competent physician is only bound to exercise his best 
judgment in determining what course of treatment is the best. 
70 C.J.s., Physicians and Surgeons, Section 44, p. 953. 
Even had the board, in this case, previously es tab-
lished the standards it announced in its findings at the hearing 
conclusion, it is clear from the record, that the evidence does 
not support their findings stated in paragraph 1 thereof: 
"We find that Robert B. Vance did not 
abide by and follow these standards in his 
treatment of patients .... " [Record p. 170] 
The record is clear that in case of the eight named 
complainants regarding whose treatment, the board made adverse 
findings, that Dr. Vance did in fact do a complete physical 
examination on seven of the eight patients and on the eighth-
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James Nickeson, there is contradicting testimony. 
In the case of Judith Sevcik, she testified (Record p. 
687] that Dr. Vance, took her medical history, examined her 
heart, and a full physical was completed and writ ten down, as 
verified by Exhibit R-4, including a complete blood survey 
analysis by Upjohn Laboratories. 
In the case of Ileen Vigil she also testified that Dr. 
Vance did several tests on her when she first went to him in 
July 1971. [Record p. 468] The Departments Exhibit V shows 
that she also received a physical examination, and the results 
were clearly recorded as shown by Exhibits U, V, X, Y, z and A. 
In the case of Mary Katsenavis, she also testified the 
Doctor took her history and examined her [Record p. 221-225] and 
the examinations and various lab tests verified by Exhibit JJ. 
In the case of Ruby Riddle, she testified that Dr. 
Vance gave her a "complete physical" including blood tests 
[Record p. 515], this also is verfied by Exhibits EE, FF and GG. 
In the case of Lois Carter, she testified that she was 
treated by Dr. Vance after several years with Dr. Conklin in the 
same clinic. She testified of numerous exams and tests given 
her by Dr. Vance. [Record p. 250-255] 
The patient Jan 
first visit she received 
weight, blood pressure, 
tolerance test [Record p. 
and KK. 
Stevens also testified that on her 
a physical exam including height, 
pulse, medical history and glucose 
436-437] and verfied by Exhibits GG 
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In spite of the overwhelming evidence the committee 
erroneously concluded that "Robert B. Vance did not abide by and 
follow these standards in his treatment of patients." Their 
conclusion is arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by the 
preponderance of the evidence presented to the committee. 
POINT IV 
THE OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE FAILED TO IMPOSE THE PROPER 
EVIDENTIARY STANDARD, BASING ITS DECISION ON HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE AND ITS DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
In hearings before this administrative tribunal, ie 
the Osteopathic Committee, the rules of evidence concerning the 
use of hearsay evidence were stated by the administrative law 
judge at the beginning of the hearing, as follows: 
"The rules here do specifically permit 
hearsay evidence but they also adopt what's 
called the residuim rule which means that 
hearsay evidence alone can't be used to 
substantiate a finding of fact." In other 
words there must be some competent evidence 
which corroborates the hearsay in order for 
the board to reach a finding." [Record p. 4] 
Of all of the medical experts who were called by the 
Department, only one testified that Dr. Vances methods of 
techniques were unprofessional. That witness was Dr. Alan J. 
Concors, an osteopath who had practiced osteopathy for 15 years, 
all outside the State of Utah, except for the one month prior to 
the hearing during which time he had practiced in Utah, in 
Tooele County beginning December 1, 1980. [Record p. 799] 
Although Dr. Concors, had practiced only one month in Utah, he 
is in practice with no other osteopaths, and is not a member of 
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the Utah Association of Osteopathic Physicians, nevertheless, he 
was the sole medical witness who testified what the acceptable 
standard of care is in the State of Utah. 
The Department's attorney asked [Record p. 820]: 
"Based on all the questions that I have 
asked you and the opinions that you have with 
regards to the practice of the respondent do 
you have any professional opinon as to 
whether this man is practicing within the 
confines of and the scope of osteopathic 
medicine as it is taught and as it should be 
Eractice9_in the State of Utah under the 
requirements of professionalism and 
professional conduct?" [Emphasis added] 
Dr. Concors answered [Record p. 821] 
" I feel that this is unacceptable, 
It's unethical and it's --- at present I just 
think its totally unprofessionale" 
Nothing i·s reflected in the record to show that Dr. 
Concors has had any experience or teaching to qualify him with 
knowledge of the Standards as "taught" and "as it should be 
practiced" IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Further Dr. Concors was allowed to testify hearsay 
testimony regarding Chelation Therapy, of the position of the 
one Dr. Ed Daring, Chairman of the Department of Ethics for 
Osteopathic Board of General Practitioners, over the objection 
of Plaintiff's counsel [Record p. 802], even though the examiner 
knew that Dr. Ed Daring would not be a witness and no 
corroboration would be given. Dr. Concors responded in the most 
inflamatory hearsay testimony, as follows: 
"Yes, that the position of the chairman 
of the Department of Ethics for the Osteo-
pathic General Practitioners College, is that 
as far as he was concerned, and the majority 
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of the profession is, that they would stand 
behind any denouncing of this type of 
treatment and management." [Record p. 802] 
Again Dr. Concors, in regard to Chelation Therapy, 
after testifying: 
"As far as its treatment in the use of 
every day general practice, and especially on 
an out patient basis, I have just never read 
anywhere in the literture. I have never read 
any text on it. And I have never come across 
it in any medical journals, either DO or MD. 
I've never heard it discussed at any medical 
conventions. And I know for a fact that it's 
not taught at any medical schools or 
osteopathic medical schools." [Record p. 804] 
Yet after admission of his lack of knowledge or 
expertise regarding Chelation Therapy, concluded that it's 
administration could be dangerous to the health of an 
individual. [Record p. 804 Line 11] 
Contrary to Dr. Concor 's biased and unqualified 
testimony, three eminently qualified physicians Dr. Halstead, 
Dr. Gordon and Dr. Gerber, testified as peers of the Plaintiff, 
that Dr. Vance's methodoligy and treatments were totally 
acceptable within the standards of practice, that Dr. Vance is 
highly qualified, a diplomate in the American Society of Medical 
Preventics which teaches and certifies the use of Chelation 
Therapy (as used by Dr. Vance) among several hundred Doctors, 
both MD and DO throughout the United States. [Record-Dr. Gordan 
p. 623~ Dr. Halstead p. 1110-1174~ Dr. Gerber p. 1007-1104] 
POINT V 
THE COMMITTEE'S DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE 
The evidentiary standard has been clearly pronounced 
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by this Court in the case Withers v. Golding, 111 P2d 550, 100 
Ut 179 (1941); at page 554: 
" ••• the Court should determine on an 
appeal in equity whether the findings of the 
committee are contrary to the CLEAR 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, before it 
rather than to determine merely whether there 
is any substantial evidence to support the 
findings." 
After making general statements regarding the newly 
formed standards, the committee then made-;' broad, findings and 
conlcusions without any corroborating, non-hearsay evidence. 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings, concludes that: 
"In as much as Chelation Therapy is not 
accepted among medical standards as a proper 
method of treatment for atherosclerosis in 
the United States, it should not be pre-
scribed as such by a physician in general 
practice • " [Record p • 170 ] 
A. CHELATION THERAPY 
Only one medical witness testified that Chelation 
Therapy was not acceptable among medical standards in the United 
States, and that was Dr. Concors, by his blatant hearsay 
statement. [Record p. 802 Line 17-22], totally uncorroborated by 
any other evidence. 
As against the worthless testimony of Dr. Concors, 
experts testifying on behalf of Dr. Vance amply validated the 
value and use by many physicians throughout the United States of 
Chelation Therapy. One of these witnesses was Dr. Michael 
Gerber, a California Medical Doctor with impressive qualif ica-
tions, including a pharmacology background, and serving on the 
Board of the prestigious Stanford Research Institute, among 
other things. [Record p. 1171] Dr. Gerber is on the Board of 
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Arner ican Academy of Medical Preventics, which has heretofore 
certified Dr. Vance as an expert, namely a diplomate, in 
Chelation Therapy. Dr. Gerber has practiced Chelation Therapy 
[Record p. 1171], and noted that the modality has been 
officially recognized by the State of California. [Record p. 
1172] Dr. Gerber also described the rigid requirements of the 
American Academy of Medical Preventics to train a physician in 
the use of Chelation Therapy. [Record p. ; 1222] Dr. Gerber's 
testimony as to Chelation Therapy, summarized, would be that 
this is a very valuable modality. 
Also testifying concerning Chelation Therapy was Dr. 
Garry Gordon, a California Osteopath and Medical Doctor, and 
co-author of a monograph published in a medical publication 
"Osteopathic Annals." [Record p. 1026] Dr. Gordon stated that 
Chelation Therapy for arteriosclerosis was started in 
approximately 1950, that improvement in circulation or improved 
blood flow is the objective. [Record 1027-1028] Dr. Gordon 
outlined the protocol for appropriate Chelation Therapy, as 
designated by the American Academy of Medical Preventics. Dr. 
Gordon indicated that there are approximately 3, 000 scientific 
articles concerning EDTA, in the records of the American 
Academy, and that the toxicity of EDTA as used for Chelation 
Therapy is approximately the same as that for aspirin or Vitamin 
A. Dr. Gordon's testimony may be summarized as being in full 
endorsement of Chelation Therapy, and its value as a modality 
for physicians. 
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value of 
Not only was there 
Chelation Therapy, 
expert 
but four 
testimony concerning 
actual patients of 
the 
Dr. 
Vance testified as to the remarkable results they had obtained 
through this therapy. 
Mr. Dean Baxter testified that he was an executive in 
the Houston area, that a doctor told him that open heart 
surgery was necessary or he would die before he left Utah, and 
that he was very sick. Baxter checked himself out of a 
hospital, went to a Utah Doctor who had scheduled him for open 
heart surgery the next day, but he went to Dr. Vance, received 
Chelation Therapy in 1977, and that he is completely recovered, 
with later checkups showing no problems. [Record p. 1325] 
Maurice Yates related the various doctors that he had 
been treated by, and that three doctors, whom he named, desired 
to cut his leg off, and that he had two artery transplants, one 
in each leg. His left leg failed. Subsequently Yates had 
Chelation Therapy (40 treatments), and still has his leg. 
[Record p. 1112] 
Benjamin Cristensen, vice president of a local Bank, 
became a patient of Dr. Vance in March 1979, having been 
previously under the care of an internist. He could not walk 
more than one or two blocks without chest pains, subsequently 
took 30 Chelation Therapy treatments from Dr. Vance, until 
September 1979. He testified that he can now walk 5 to 7 miles 
without pain, even hikes in the mountains, snowmobiles, and 
takes no nitroglycerin. [Record 1124-1127] 
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Willard Porter was a patient of Dr. Vance in 1975 or 
1976, now being 81 years of age. Previously he had been under 
the care of 2 or 3 Doctors, had chest pains, shortness of 
breath, and other symptoms. Prior to seeing Dr. Vance for 
treatment he had been so weak he could not stand up, could not 
sleep, and had given up hope. Porter took 20 Chelation 
Treatments, also being put on a strict diet, and feels hale and 
hearty and is very active, entertaining school children with a 
musical novelty act, playing on a musical saw, also playing the 
harmonica with his nose, and enjoys life very much. [Record p. 
1129] Following Mr. Porter's testimony, Osteopathic Doctor Hase 
said "Congratulations, Sir." 
Such a situation as is involved herein was involved in 
the matter of Rogers v. State Board of Medical Examiners of 
Florida, District Court of Appeals, First District, State of 
Florida, January term, 1979, Case No. EE-454 (date of opinion, 
January 9, 1979), 371 So. 2nd 1037, Certiorari denied by Florida 
Supreme Court, September 17, 1979 (376 So. 2d 76). 
Dr. Robert J. Rogers has practiced medicine in Brevard 
County, Florida, treating various of his patients with Chelation 
Therapy, for arteriosclerosis and other circulatory diseases. 
The Brevard County Medical Association entered an Order causing 
the suspension of his license to practice and threatened 
expulsion from the Association, and imposing other punishment, 
as well. 
stated: 
The question on appeal as posed by the Court was 
" 
Florida 
to what extent does 
have cons ti tu tional 
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prohibit a non-harmful mode of medical 
treatment by a licensed physician after full 
disclosure to, and election by, a patient?" 
The Court noted in its Opinion that Dr. Rogers had engaged in 
use of Chelation Therapy for treatment of arteriosclerosis, 
which procedure had not been authorized by . the Florida State 
Board of Medical Examiners. The Court also defined "Chelation 
Therapy" in terms analogous to the therapy used by Dr. Vance 
herein. The Court also stated that the Flo·rida Legislature had 
a right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations to control 
practice of medicine, and that such regulations must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the general welfare of the public. 
The Court noted, howeve~: 
" in that regard it is relevant to 
note that neither BCMA, the hearing 
officer,nor the Board has made any findings 
that Chelation Therapy is in any respect 
harmful or hazardous to the patient. Rather, 
the Board's decision appears to have been 
based upon the Hearing Officer's administra-
tive determination that Chelation Therapy is 
a 'quackery under the guise of scientific 
medicine ••• " 
The Court's opinon was then addressed to the right of 
privacy of both physician and patient, the Court affirming that 
the right to make a private decision as between patient and 
attending physician is one well-recognized. The opinon further 
states: 
" We hold that under the provision of 
the Constitution, in the absence of a demon-
stration of unlawfulness, harm, fraud, coer-
cion or misrepresentation, respondent Board 
is without authority to deprive Petitioner's 
patients of their voluntary election to 
receive Chelation Therapy simply because that 
mode of treatment has not received the 
endorsement of a majority of the medical pro-
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fess ion. It necessarily follows that under 
such circumstances Respondent Board is 
without authority to prohibit petitioner from 
administering Chelation Therapy. 
"History teaches us that virtually all 
progress in science and medicine has been 
accomplished as the result of the courageous 
efforts of those members of the profession 
willing to pursue their theories in the face 
of tremendous odds despite the criticisms of 
fellow practitioners. Copernicus was thought 
to be a heretic when he theorized that the 
Earth was not the center of the Universe. 
Banishment and prison was the , reward for 
discovering that the World was round. 
Pasteur was ridiculed for his theory that 
unseen organisms caused infections. Freud 
met only resistance and derision in 
pioneering the field of psychiatry. In our 
own era chiropractic treatment has been slow 
in receiving the approval of the other 
professions of the healing arts. We can only 
wonder what would have been the condition of 
the World today in the field of medicine in 
particular had those in the midstream of 
their profession been permitted to prohibit 
continued treatment and thereby impede 
progress in those and other fields of science 
and the healing arts •.• " 
The record herein is devoid of any probative or 
competent evidence justifying the criticisms of the Osteopathic 
Committee of Chelation Therapy, and it is further most evident 
that at no time has the Osteopathic Committee of Utah ever 
adopted any standards, or regulations whereby a physician could 
deem that employing Chelation Therapy would be "unprofessional 
conduct". 
B. LAETRILE 
The Osteopathic Committee also undertook to attack 
Laetrile in their findings as follows: 
"We find that Laetrile (Amygdalin, B-17) 
should not be prescribed in lieu of standard 
accepted medical treatment for a patient 
suffering from cancer." · 
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As previously noted, at no time was there any 
designation herein as to what would constitute "standard 
accepted medical treatment" ~for cancer patients. And, once 
again, the Utah Osteopathic Committee had not before issuing its 
decision adopted any standards whatsoever which would proscribe 
use of Laetrile by a physician exercising his best judgment and 
discretion as to the welfare of his patient. 
As to Laetrile, its safety ~and efficacy, and 
usefulness as to various types of cancer cases, expert testimony 
by Dr. Bruce Halstead, California Medical Doctor, Clinician, and 
Biotoxicologist was most comprehensive, and which stands 
unrefuted and undenied herein. [Record 1270-1334] Also, one 
Alice Pearson, a patient of Dr. Vance, suffering from the most 
serious type of cancer, namely multiple myeloma, testified that 
she had been receiving Laetrile up until the time she testified, 
that a previous Doctor stated she would have fractures over her 
body. However, she stated that, at 67, she now feels very well, 
does all her own yardwork and gardening, contrary to her 
terrible condition before seeing Dr. Vance. She further stated 
that her pain started leaving almost immediately after Laetrile 
injections were commenced, with no side effects whatsoever. (Tr. 
962-966) 
There is nothing whatsoever illegal or improper about 
utilization of Laetrile by a physician. Thus far, 24 states 
have specifically sanctioned use of Laetrile by special 
legislation (Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington, Montana, Colorado, Kentucky, West Virginia, and 
California). Concerning the propriety of use of Laetrile at the 
Federal level, the same has been validated and approved as 
recently as May 1, 1981, by decision of the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma in the case of Rutherford 
et al v. United States of America, Joseph Califano, Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare; Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of 
the Food and Drug Administration, et al. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in Cause No. CIV-75-0218-B, an unreported 
decision, [Record p. 241-248] . 
The 
Laetrile were 
capricious. 
findings 
clearly 
of the Osteopathic Commit tee as to 
erroneous, improper and arbitrary and 
c. In the case of each of the eight persons who were 
subjects of findings by the Osteopathic Committee, Dr. Vance was 
charged with some sort of professional misconduct purportedly 
warranting revocation of his osteopathic license. Upon a review 
of each case, the transcript is replete with innuendo, new 
charges which were not in the original petition and complaint 
and therefore irrelevant to the actual charges of the petition, 
voluminous amounts of hearsay evidence, attacks by the 
Prosecutor on medical modalities which properly should be 
considered only as differences of medical opinion which occur 
between physicians. What follows is a review, in the light of 
the charges, to demonstrate the paucity, even total lack, of 
proper and competent evidence, to warrant the findings of the 
osteopaths below. 
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1. Lois Carter (Petition, Charge 7I) The charge of 
the petition was: 
"I. Prior to December 1975, Robert B. 
Vance did for a period of approximately six 
years treat Lois Carter for hypoglycemia 
which he told her she had; that the 
laboratory tests on said Lois Carter did not 
indicate her having hypoglycemia; that Robert 
B. Vance provided other treatment consisting 
of wet pads placed under each shoulder blade, 
behind each ear and a pad with a strap across 
the forehead at which time Lois Carter was 
hooked or connected to a machine which, 
according to the attendants of Robert B. 
Vance, was used for the relaxation of the 
adrenal gland. The treatment for hypogly-
cemia was for a non-existent condition and 
Robert B~ Vance knew or should have known it 
did not exist and the treatment with the wet 
pads and machine for the purpose of relaxing 
the adrenal gland was not then and is not now 
an accepted medical procedure by the stand-
ards of his profession and amounts to gross 
incompetency in the practice of osteopathy." 
[Record p. 176] 
The findings of the osteopaths below were: 
"I. We find the allegations to be 
substantially supported by the evidence." 
[ Record p • l 7 0 ] 
The petition herein reached back to 1969, or 
approximately 11 years before the hearings herein took place, 
for charges against Plaintiff concerning Lois Carter. In and of 
itself, such action must necessarily be considered unjust, 
unfair, and no doubt illegal, due to the tremendous lapse of 
time which intervened between the period of treatment involved 
and the time of the hearings. 
In any event, the record herein is devoid of any 
proper evidence to warrant the findings. 
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Relative to the "wet pads and machine" portion of the 
charges, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by Lois Carter. 
Concerning the serious charge that Lois Carter never 
had hypoglycemia, the record contains no evidence whatsoever. 
It was Lois Carter's testimony [Record 586] that she had gone to 
a Doctor other than Dr. Vance and had a hypoglycemia test, which 
was negative. This hearsay testimony was corroberated by Dr. 
William Pace, a psychiatrist who had treated Lois Carter from 
time to time. He testified [Record 930] that he obtained a 
glucose tolerance test for Lois Carter in April 1977 which was 
negative for hypoglycemia [Record 931]. This was almost two 
years after Dr. Vance last treated her, and about 8 years after 
Dr. Vance commenced his treatments. 
Ir anything, the 1977 test only demonstrates that Dr. 
Vance was successful in eliminating any hypoglycemic condition 
he observed in 1969, and by treating her during the six years 
ensuing. Dr. Pace himself testified that hypoglycemia is 
treatable and can be brought back within normal limits [Record 
936] . 
There was no basis at all for the osteopaths to find 
Dr. Vance guilty of "gross incompetence in the practice of 
osteopathy" concerning his treatment of Lois Carter. 
2. In this 
instance, the petition reached back approximately ten years 
before the hearings took place. The charge was: 
"H. Robert B. Vance undertook to treat 
and did treat Ruby Riddle, beginning on 
November 2, 1970, for 'relative hypoglycemia 
secondary to chronic subcli:-iical adrenal 
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cortex hypofunction'; that thereafter Robert 
B. Vance treated said Ruby Riddle for 
arteriosclorosis, using a procedure Called 
Chelation Therapy; that he also used a 
procedure called myoflex; that the clinical 
history and laboratory tests and said patient 
did not indicate a condition known as hypo-
glycemia and the use of Chelation Therapy to 
treat arteriosclerosis by removal of calcium 
in· the body is not a medically accepted 
method or procedure and can result in harm or 
death to a patient." [Record p. 176] 
The findings were: 
"H. We find the allegations to be 
true. He charged for a Cronogram (Kirlian 
Photography) which he testified he was doing 
for research purposes, without notifying the 
patient of such fact and admitted its use as 
a diagnostic tool was of questionable value." 
The findings concerning Ruby Riddle were premised 
solely upon her hearsay testimony relating to her treatment by 
Dr. Vance 7 to 10 years prior to the time of the hearings. 
There was no medical testimony concerning her. The record is 
devoid of any evidence relative to the charge that she never had 
hypoglycemia. 
Likewise, the record is devoid of any evidence that 
Dr. Vance's judgment to render Chelation Therapy for Ruby Riddle 
was improper. Whether or not Chelation Therapy would be 
"medically accepted" by the Prosecution certainly cannot 
constitute a basis for concluding Dr. Vance to be guilty of 
professional misconduct. The record herein shows that many 
physicians throughout the United States, including osteopaths, 
employ Chelation Therapy as a useful modality for their 
patients, and the record herein further reveals it to be an 
effective modality in many cases. 
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The findings concerning Ruby Riddle gratuitously 
injected new matter not the subject of any charge, namely a 
"Cronogram" [Record p. 171] (sic) allegedly taken by Dr. Vance. 
It is respectfully submitted that this purported "finding" 
should from no "ex. post facto" basis for validation of the 
charges against Dr. Vance in the Petition herein. 
3. Milo Adams (Petition, charge 7R) Reaching back for 
a period of about 7 years, the charge was: 
"R. Robert B. Vance undertook to treat 
a patient by the name of Milo J. Adams 
beginning on or about August 4th, 1973 on the 
basis of his following diagnosis: 'Hypoka-
lemia; hypochlorhdria; latent diabetes 
mellitus; diabetogenic and reactive hypogly-
cemia; subclinical hypoadrenocorticism, 
arterio scleritic heart disease." 
Robert B. Vance treated said patient 
through to September 26, 1973 for the 
foregoing-stated conditions. The laboratory 
tests and clinical examination did not indi-
cate said patient was suffering from any or 
all of the foregoing conditions. Robert B. 
Vance knew or should have known he was treat-
ing said patient for non-existent health pro-
blems, maladies and dysfunctions and his con-
duct therein amounts to gross incompetency in 
the practice of osteopathy." [Record p. 179] 
The findings were: 
"R. We find the allegations to be 
substantially supported by the evidence. 
As will be noted, the charges concerning Milo Adams 
accuse Dr. Vance of "gross incompetency" based upon his alleged 
treatment of "non-existent heal th problems, maladies, and 
dysfunctions". For five of these conditions, namely 
"Hypokalemia" (sic), "hypochlorhdria" {sic), latent diabetes 
mellitus", "subclinical lypoadrenocorticism", and "arterio 
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scleritic heart disease" no evidence whatsoever was introduced 
in support of the charges. 
Relative to the alleged non-existence of any 
hypoglycemia condition, no evidence was presented as to the 
propriety of Dr. Vance's original diagnosis. Only the testimony 
of one Dr. Allen Barker was offered [Record p. 841] relative to 
a glucose tolerance test which he had ordered for Adams. Dr. 
Barker said the test was "essentially normal" [Record p. 844] , 
but even he noted a four-hour low sugar value [Record p. 845], 
further conceding that a side effect of the drug, "Aventyl", 
which had been administered to Adams, could show "fluctuation of 
blood sugar levels". [Record p. 856] 
However, this test had been performed in December, 
1973, some fou!_E!onths after Dr. Vance had commenced his 
treatment of Adams. 
Under these circumstances the only probative value of 
Dr. Barker's testimony was to substantiate Dr. Vance's success 
in eliminating any condition of hypoglycemia, not to support a 
charge of "gross incompetency". 
4 • Ileen Vigil (Petition, Charge 7E) The charge 
reaching back for a period of about 9 years, was: 
"E. On or about the 29th day of July, 
1971, and for several years thereafter Robert 
B. Vance did undertake to diagnose and treat 
Ileen J. Vigil; that in such treatments his 
records reveal that he used a method of 
treatment which is not medically accepted and 
proved; that he failed to properly diagnose 
the medical problems of said Ileen J. Vigil 
and furthermore failed to understand the 
diseases he purported to diagnose and treat 
with regard to his patient." [Record p. 175] 
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.fl 
The findings were: 
"E. We find the allegation to be true 
and substantially supported by the evidence." 
~ 
As to the "shotgun" charge that Dr. Vance used "a 
method of treatment which is not medically accepted and proved", 
no evidence whatsoever was introduced concerning what such 
treatment might be, let alone its "acceptability". 
Nor was any evidence whatsoever -·introduced that Dr. 
Vance had "failed" to properly diagnose Ileen Vigil's medical 
problems, or that he "failed to understand the diseases he 
purported to diagnose and treat". 
s. James Nickeson (Petition, Charge 7II) In this 
instance Dr. Vance undertook unsuccessfully, to help a terminal 
cancer patient. 
Basically the charge was that at the end of December 
1978, Dr. Vance consulted by telephone with the mother of James 
Nickeson, and was advised that her son was suffering from Ewings 
Sarcoma, a type of terminal bone cancer, that he assured the 
mother that much could be done for her son, that if she could 
get James Nickeson to Salt Lake City Dr. Vance could save him. 
The charges further state the on January 5, 1979, James Nickeson 
was carried on a stretcher into the office of Dr. Vance, where 
he was immediately administered an I. V. injection containing 
vitamins and laetrile. It was further charged that no 
examination was given or that any tests of any kind had been 
taken prior thereto. It was further charged that Dr. Vance 
instructed Mr. and Mrs. Nickeson to take their son to a motel 
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where he would send his nurse each day to administer I.V. 
injections and that the nurse would instruct the parents as to 
items needed for such medication. 
It was further alleged that a urine sample was taken 
to be sent to a laboratory in Seattle, Washington, from which a 
serum could be made for treatment of the patient. Additionally, 
it was alleged that Dr. Vance took a blood sample, for another 
laboratory, the results of which would be informative. It was 
further alleged that although Mr. and Mrs. Nickeson requested 
results of the tests, they had received no response from Dr. 
Vance. It was further charged that during the entire time from 
the day when Nickeson was in the office of Dr. Vance, initially, 
and during the time he stayed at a local hotel facility for ten 
days, namely until January 16, 1979, not once did Dr. Vance 
attend him, leaving all such matters in the hands of his nurse, 
who daily administered the I. V. solution. It was alleged that 
the I. v. injections consisted of one-half bottle of glucose, 
~ome Vitamin C and liquid "Laetrile"e It was further alleged 
that on January 16, 1979 the patient was flown back to Casper, 
Wyoming, passing away on January 26, 1979. It was further 
charged that the parents relied upon the representations of Dr. 
Vance that he could save their son, and consequently expended 
substantial sums, and that the patient suffered greatly from the 
administration of the I.V. injections and other medications. 
The three osteopaths below found that there was 
evidence of "gross negligence" on the part of Dr. Vance, that 
the diagnostic process had not been completed, that he 
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instituted intravenous therapy before doing a physical examina-
tion, and in fact never did a physical examination, that the 
patient was treated with "questionable therapy" in lieu of 
"standard medical treatment", that he improperly discontinued 
"Coumadin Therapy", that in spite of the fact that Dr. Vance had 
gained a great deal of knowledge in the field of preventative 
medicine, assuming primary care for the patient was beyond the 
scope of his additional knowledge. 
The aforesaid findings were almost completely predi-
cated upon the testimony of Betty Nickeson, grieving mother of 
the terminal cancer patient, James Nickeson. It is obvious from 
a review of her testimony that she was embittered and hostile, 
not only as to Dr. Vance, but as to any other Doctors who had 
rendered treatment for her son. [Record p. 446] According to 
her somewhat incredible testimony, a Wyoming doctor had discov-
ered that her son had bone cancer, that Doctor knew nothing 
about tumors and could do nothing for him, and she had lost 
confidence in him, he having supposedly operated through a 
tumor, placing a cast over it, and subsequently simply just 
walking out on his patient, while not ref erring the family to 
anybody for further treatment. [Record p. 446] It is -respect-
fully submitted that this testimony by Mrs. Nickeson against a 
physician not even a party to this proceeding must be taken with 
some doubts, and also is illustrative of her almost hysterical 
animus against Doctors, including Dr. Vance, who had treated her 
deceased son. 
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Mrs. Nickeson's most extreme and questionable 
statement concerning Dr. Vance was that he, in effect, had 
promised to "cure" the incurable cancer with which her son was 
afflicted. As against this, Dr. Vance testified repeatedly that 
never at any time had he promised he would render a cure for 
James Nickeson, For example, Dr. Vance testified [Record p. 
991] : 
"I've heard what Mrs. Betty Nickeson has 
testified and there are some things at which 
I am in gross and marked disagreement with 
her. No I, never at any time did I ever 
promise that I would render a cure for her 
son. In fact, I have taught my nurses and 
I've written it down many, many times in 
patients' charts which can be documented, 
that the best we can hope for in medicine is 
a control; that in fact the physician doesn't 
cure anything. Some physicians may think 
they do. But the best we can affect is to 
help the body through the intelligent 
application of the knoweldge we have at hand 
to achieve a therapeutic control." 
Mrs. Nickeson's statements in this regard must also be 
considered against what were notable instances of false state-
men ts she made as to Dr. Vance's actual treatment for James 
Nickeson. 
For example, Mrs. Nickeson stated [Record p. 355]: 
"In the entire time we were here - 10 or 11 days - he never 
examined him once and never directly talked to that boy one 
time." As against this sweeping statement was the testimony of 
Kathleen Berry, a Licensed Practical Nurse, and General Nurse 
for Dr. Vance, who had stayed specially on a Friday at Dr. 
Vance's office, when James Nickeson had been initially in the 
Vance offices and clinic. She testified that he arrived on a 
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stretcher, was placed on a table, and that Dr. Vance talked at 
length to him and his parents. [Record p. 954-955] Dr. Vance 
noted that this inital visit and consultation lasted a minimum 
of 4 hours with the patient and his family. [Record p. 1005] 
Nurse Berry further testified that on this initial consultation, 
she was asked to draw a blood sample, that he wrote orderes, a 
hair analysis test was ordered and I. V. injections were made. 
The family had brought hospital records and x-rays. [Record p. 
956-957] Even according to Mrs. Nickeson, Dr. Vance had 
previously requested all available records and x-rays and that 
these records were given to Dr.Vance after they arrived. [Record 
p. 354-355] 
Various of these records are in evidence herein, for 
example, Exhibit PPP, and which are voluminous, additionally. 
including additional tests and medical information gathered by 
Dr. Vance. In this connection, Dr. Vance testified that he knew 
what the medical problem was already, having reviewed the 
medical records from Wyoming, and having himself submitted 
additional blood samples for a special test from a Michigan 
laboratory. [Record p. 1071] In view of these circumstances, 
why would it have been necessary for Dr. Vance to render a 
physical examination of Nickeson, when his condition was already 
known and verified? The record was already clear that Nickeson 
had sustained a broken back and a broken leg as a result of a 
work accident, compounded by terminal condition of cancer, 
Ewings Sarcoma. The Wyoming physicians had told Nickeson his 
time was very short. [Record p. 440] 
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Subsequently (contrary to Mrs. Nickeson' s 
testimony) Dr. Vance rendered physical examinations 
patient. [Record p. 1005,1071] 
false 
of his 
Nurse Berry testified that the Nickeson family desired 
to have James Nickeson in a Salt Lake City motel facility, 
rather than a standardized medical facility because it would be 
cheaper, and that the family wanted to do as much of the nursing 
care as possible. [Record p. 962] This was confirmed by Dr. 
Vance, who testified that he desired to minimize costs, that it 
made the circumstances more cost effective for the Nickesons to 
be in a motel environment where the family could render care 
which was needed. Dr. Vance also testified that no service 
which was to be rendered could be rendered better in a hospital 
than under the circumstances at hand. [Record p. 998-999] This 
facts stand unrefuted and undenied herein. 
Mrs. Nickeson testified [Record p. 357] that she told 
Dr. Vance: "We can't put that boy every day hauling him down 
the stairs for an I.V." 
Accordingly Nurse Berry was delegated by Dr. Vance to 
visit Nickeson, administer I.V. injections and to help regarding 
nursing and in any other way possible. [Record p. 958] Nurse 
Berry stated that the Nickeson family called her at her home 
often. They also had Dr. Vance's home telephone, and if she 
could not answer questions, she referred them to Dr. Vance. 
[Record p. 964] Dr. Vance testified that he was in contact 
constantly with his nurse staff concerning the Nickeson case, 
and periodically visited Nickeson to ascertain his condition. 
[Record p. 947-1001] 
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The circumstances herein also demonstrate that, even 
as to what ultimately proved to be a hopeless case, Dr. Vance 
made every effort to help his patient. He testified in this 
regard that treatment in a similar case in Arizona had proved 
beneficial. [Record p. 994] Nurse Berry testified that on 
January 8, 1979, Nickeson's headaches stopped, his temperature 
broke, he woke up hungry, with less pain, and his color and 
alertness had improved. [Record p. 961] She further testified 
that during the 10 days Nickeson was in the City, some days he 
seemed better, and others not, but his color seemed improved, he 
seemed to be alert, he was more talkative and didn't seem to 
have as much pain. 
However, in retrospect he did not recover from his 
terminal condition. Certainly this is not grounds for 
revocation of Dr. Vance's professional license. If so, any 
physician who was unsuccessful in treating a patient would lose 
his license, and then there would be no physicians left in the 
United States, because no Doctor is 100% successful in his 
treatment. 
The Osteopathic Committee complained that Dr. Vance 
did not use "standard medical therapy" for James Nickeson's 
cancer. However, the record is not only devoid of any evidence 
as to what a "successful standard medical therapy" might have 
been for a patient diagnosed as terminal and having only a short 
time to live, but how it would have reversed a terminal 
condition. Dr. Vance did, under these circumstances, sanction 
use of "Laetrile" for Nickeson, and which has been efficacious 
in many difficult cancer cases. 
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If one were to accept Mrs. Nickeson's testimony herein 
at fact value, it could only be concluded that she and her 
family were bitterely dissatisfied about the treatment of their 
son by Dr. Vance. But they were not. Nurse Berry testified 
that no complaints of dissatisfaction were made to her while the 
Nickesons were in Salt Lake City,and that before they left the 
Nickesons took her to dinner "in appreciation" for all they felt 
she had done for their son. [Record p. 967] / Dr. Vance testified 
that there had been no problems whatsoever with the Nickesons 
during their stay in Salt Lake City. [Record p. 998] And, af~er 
the Nickesons returned to Wyoming, Mrs. Nickeson wrote a letter, 
which comprises a portion of Exhibit PPP herein, dated January 
19, 1979, addressed to "Hi Everyone", reporting in friendly tone 
what was transpiring in Wyoming, and terminating_ with "Hi, 
Kathy!" 
6. Mary Katsenevas (Petition, Charge 7G) The charge, 
as relating to this person who was not a bona fide patient, was: 
"G. On or about the 17th day of 
September, 1979, Robert B. Vance undertook to 
and did treat Mary Katsenevas for a condition 
he called 'Diabetogenic Hypoglycemia' when in 
fact the results of her glucose tolerance 
test showed her to be within normal 1 imi ts; 
that diagnosing and patient as being in the 
'latent diabetic zone' and as having 'Reac-
tive Hypoglycemia' and thereafter treating 
her accordingly, is false and misleading and 
contrary to the acceptable standards of 
practice." 
The findings were: 
"G. We find the allegations to be true 
in that the evidence showed that Robert B. 
Vance did not do a physical examination; he 
used iridology, an unaccepted and unproven 
methods of diagnosis, and diagnosed 
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hypothyroidism from a low axillary 
temperature with disregard for normal 
laboratory tests." [Record p. 1 71] 
Dr. Vance performed a glucose tolerance test for Mary 
Katsenevas, concluding that she had "Reactive Hypoglycemia". 
(See Exhibit I) 
To ostensibly support the charges that Mary 
Katsenevas did not have hypoglycemia the prosecution introduced 
testimony of two Doctors. However, on direct examination Dr. L. 
Wayland MacFarlane denied that he had performed a glucose 
tolerance test for her, that only a single "blood sugar" test 
having been taken March 30, 1977, concerning which he did not 
make any determination concerning a condition of hypoglycemia. 
[ Rec o rd p • 6 5 4 ] 
Mary Katsenevas had also been referred by the Attorney 
General to Dr. Robert K. Maddock, who examined her on February 
11, 1980. He testified that she was depressed, and not very 
well when he saw her. [Record p. 494-496] Dr. Maddock testified 
that he diag~osed Mary Katsenevas as having a form of reactive 
hypoglycemia, alimentary-type [Record p. 423] He also stated 
that he would put this type of patient on a diabetic diet to 
control carbohydrate intake. [Record p. 399] 
Thus, far from supporting the charges against Dr. 
Vance that Mary Katsenevas did not have a condition of 
hypoglycemia, Dr. Maddock in fact precisely confirmed Dr. 
Vance's diagnosis. 
As if recognizing that the charges concerning Mary 
Katsenevas were baseless, the Osteopathic Committee below 
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"found" the charges to be true "in that the evidence showed that 
Robert B. Vance did not do a physical examination". Why a 
physical examination would be necessary to investigate for 
hypoglycemia is not explained any where in the record herein. 
And, Dr. Vance testified at some length concerning the nature of 
his examinations. [Record p. 921] The Osteopathic Commit tee 
also found fault with the manner in which Dr. Vance had 
diagnosed hypothyroidism. It is worthy: of note that Mary 
Katsenevas had actually been under treatment several years for 
thyroid problems before she went to Dr. Vance. [Record p. 571] 
Lastly, the osteopaths er i ticized Dr. Vance's use on 
occasion of Irid.ology, stating it to be "unaccepted and 
unproven". Yet their own witness, Dr. Concor s verified the 
validity of diagnosing arteriosclerosis by examining the eyes. 
[Record p. 805] No other evidence was introduced against the 
use of iridology, however Dr. Gerber, gave unrefuted testimony 
that ir idology is a form of diagnosis widely used around the 
world. [Record p. 1178] 
These new and irrelevant "findings", which serve to 
obscure the fact that no evidence whatsoever supported the 
actual charges against Dr. Vance, should certainly form no basis 
for upholding a revocation of Dr. Vance's professional license. 
7. Judith Sevcik (Petition, Charge 7A) This employee 
of a TV station was also a false patient. The charges were: 
"A. On or about the 6th day of April, 
1978, Robert B. Vance did undertake to treat 
Judith Sevcik on the basis of his diagnosis 
dated April 19, 1978, that Robert B. Vance, 
furthermore, recommended and did thereafter 
provide inappropriate treatment for 
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nonexistent diseases in said Judi th Sevcik; 
that the treatment for arteriosclerosis, 
which condition did not exist in said 
patient, was called "Chelation Therapy", a 
medical procedure not acceptable in the 
medical practice and the use of which can 
cause a danger to the health, welfare or 
safety of a patient.: 
The findings were: 
"A. We find the allegations to be true 
in that Robert B. Vance provided necessary 
and unproven medical treatment for 
atherosclerosis by giving Chelation Therapy." 
Judith Sevcik went to Dr. Vance for approximately one 
year in an attempt to gather something against him. To mislead 
the Doctor, she lied about her symptoms, and gave an inaccurate 
history. [Record p. 729] Any vitamin or other medications were 
not taken by her, but simply turned over to her TV station 
employer. [Tr. 710] She concealed from Dr. Vance that she had 
an enlarged ovary problem. [Record 719] She did not tell Dr. 
Vance about her mid-systolic heart click syndrome. [Record 729] 
Judith Sevcik solicited Dr. Vance for Chelation 
Therapy treatments. [Record 721] She stated: 
"I continued about a year. And the main 
purpose was for Dr. Vance -- for us to get 
Dr. Vance to put me on the Chelation 
treatments. We didn't really think it would 
take a whole year, but it was from October to 
October, I think. And I took two Chelation 
treatments at the time that I quit seeing 
him. II 
Dr. Maddock testified as to physical examinations of 
Judith Sevcik performed approximately one year before she 
finally was able to obtain Chelation Therapy treatments from Dr. 
Vance. Based upon his examination and test, very, limited in 
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nature, Dr. Maddock concluded that in October 1977 he made no 
physical findings indicating cardiovascular disease. However, 
when asked about Chelation Therapy, subject of the charges 
concerning Judith Sevcik, he stated that he knew very little 
about it, and that it would be best "not to pursue that 
question." Meanwhile, Dr. Maddock testified herein that "from 
the time we start breathing by ourselves, we start gathering 
calcification in the arteries around the ,heart and our lower 
extremities." [Record 419] He also testified that "short of an 
autopsy, it's pretty difficult to determine the extent of the 
arterial calcification." [Record p. 420] As disclosed by 
experts in Chelation Therapy who testified herein for Dr. Vance, 
a primary purpose of Chelation Therapy is to remove calcium 
deposits which build up in the arteries. However, Dre Maddock 
offered no testimony in this regard, being ignorant of what 
Chelation Th~rapy involved. Nor did his testimony in any manner 
support a charge that rendering of two Chelation Therapy 
treatments for Judith Sevcik, based upon her false symptoms, 
history, and concealment of her physical condition, after 
requesting the same for approximately one year, constituted 
professional misconduct on the part of Dr. Vance. 
8. Jan Stevens (Petition, Ch~fge 7HH) this was 
another false patient who presented false symptoms, history, and 
information to Dr. Vance in an attempt to create charges against 
him. The charges were: 
"HH. Robert B. Vance on April 2, 1980 
undertook treatment of a patient by the name 
of Jan Stevens on the basis of his following 
diagnosis: 'Reactive: Hypoglycemia; Subclini-
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cal Hypoadrenocorticism; Hyporproteinemia; 
multiple mineral deficiencies and imbalances; 
chronic acne trugar is and reaction syndrome 
food." 
·Robert B. Vance treated said patient 
through to May 21, 1980 for some or all of 
the foregoing conditions. The laboratory 
tests and clinical examinations did not 
indicate said patient was suffering from all 
or any of said diagnosed conditions and he 
knew or should have known he was treating 
and charging for treatment of non-existent 
heal th problems, maladies and body dysfunc-
tions. His conduct therein amounts to gross 
incompetency in the practice of osteopathy." 
The findings were: 
"HH. We find the allegations to be 
substantially supported by the evidence." 
The testimony of one Dr. Harold Rosenberg was offered 
in support of the charges. Dr. Rosenberg stated several times 
taht he was not an expert as to hypoglycemia [Record p. 750] He 
testified that he had ordered laboratory tests for Jan Stevens. 
A Laboratory report of the Wasatch Pathologic Laboratories, Salt 
Lake City, bearing a hand-written notation "Stevens, Jan" was 
identified by him, and he based various of his medical 
conclusions thereon. For example, as to whether or not Jan 
Stevens had a condition of hypoproteinemia, Dr. Rosenberg 
testified: "No, I don't see any evidence of that judging from 
her general chemistry surveys." [Record p. 744] Likewise, the 
Doctor testified that he saw no evidence of multiple mineral 
deficiencies and imbalances, or subclinical hypoadrenocorticism. 
[Record p. 744] As to the presence of any acne, he stated, "Is 
there any notation made on that? I think she may have had a few 
acne form - that wasn't very impressive though." [Record p. 744] 
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After giving testimony Dr. Rosenberg upon cross 
examination realized that he had been testifying from a 
laboratory report relating to one "Conrad Hintze", not a report 
relating to Jan Stevens. when this was called to his attention, 
he stated [Record p. 754]: "I am suggesting that we contact the 
Wasatch Pathological Laboratories and find out what the truth of 
the matter is." 
Later in the proceeding Prosecutor Halgren announced, 
"We have obtained on Jan Stevens a correct laboratory report 
from Wasatch Laboratories. I have given a copy to counsel and I 
would like to substitute or include it in that particular 
exhibit." [Record p. 868] However, Dr. Rosenberg never 
testified concerning the right laboratory report, or as to his 
conclusions therefrom. 
Overall, as to the charges involving Jan Stevens, only 
the flimsiest, insubstantial, and unreliable evidence was 
adduced, and the findings were not supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence, and the decision is arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY TREATING THE CASE AS A REVIEW 
INSTEAD OF AN "ACTION" 
The appeal of hearings before the Department of 
Registration is controlled by the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 § 58-1-36 which provides: 
" any person directly affected or 
aggrieved by any ruling of the department of 
registration, may within thirty days after 
notice of such ruling institute AN ACTION in 
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the District Court of the county •.. against 
the director in his official capacity •..• " 
This Court in the case of Withers v. Golding 100 Utah 
179, 111 P2d 550 (1949) concluded that the purpose of the 
legislature in enacting this section, was not merely to provide 
review similar to certiorari, but to confer upon the District 
Court power to inquire into those grievances set out in the 
Plaintiff's Complaint touching the entire proceedings before the 
department, including claim that findings were contrary to the 
weight of the evidence; to include issues raised by the 
pleadings before the Court. 
The District Court in this matter concluded in its 
denial of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss: 
Even if the dee is ion of the Comrni t tee 
were voidable by reason of Dr. Greenwood's 
lack of qualifications to sit thereon, it 
could only be voided at the instance of an 
agrieved party who has made a timely protest. 
Appellant raises the point for the first time 
on appeal and his objection is untimely." 
[Record P. 127] 
The Courts ruling was clearly erroneous, since if the 
appeal is a new action, the Court must consider all issues 
raised by the Plaintiff on appeal, which includes the 
disqualification of the board member, raised du~ing the appeal, 
as well as other issues raised in the pleadings. 
POINT VII 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY THE "PREPONDERANCE 
OF EVIDENCE" RULE TO TEST THE VALIDITY OF THE COMMITTEE'S 
FINDINGS 
This Court has determined that in license revocation 
-47-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proceedings involving an appeal from the decision of the 
Department of Registration 
" ••• the Court should determine as on an 
appeal in equity whether the findings of the 
committee are contrary to the CLEAR 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE before it, 
rather than to determine merely whether there 
is any substantial evidence to support such 
findings." Withers v. Golding, 111 P2d 550 
100 Utah 179 (1941) 
In addition to the fact that 1the District Court 
erroneously upheld a disqualified committee's revocation of 
Appellant's license, and erroneously treated the case as a 
review only refusing to allow any introduction of evidence in 
this "new action" a$ allowed by Statute and concluded the matter 
solely based on its review of the transcript in the commit tee 
1learing. The Court then failed to apply the "clear 
preponderance of the evidence" test and instead concluded as 
follows: 
"The Committee was unusually cautious in 
its specific allegations in paragraph 8 of 
the Petition, for example the Committee made 
"no findings" on 27 out of the 34, apparently 
not finding there to be sufficient evidence 
upon which to base any findings." [Record p. 
250] 
A reading of the transcript will show that the 
Department of Registration only presented evidence on one of the 
other 27, and the committee's failure to make findings had 
nothing to do with their being "unusually cautious" as concluded 
by the District Court. 
In addition the District Court then concluded: 
This Court may not substitute its 
judgment on factual matters for that of the 
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fact finding body unless that body has 
clearly acted capriciously or arbitrary, or 
UNLESS ITS CONCLUSIONS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. (Emphasis added) [Record p. 250] 
.;;;;. 
The District Court erred in its application of the 
evidentiary standard, in its handling of the "action" as a 
review only, and in its total failure to weigh the evidence and 
determine whether the preponderance of the evidence supported 
the findings of the committee: The District Court errors, 
totally deprived the Appellant of due process protection and the 
right to have his "action" heard in accordance with the 
standards established by the laws of the State of Utah, and the 
standards established by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case at bar, the Osteopathic Committee hearing 
this case, albeit an improperly constituted body, have become an 
unauthorized judicial body, which has acted without compliance 
to the statutes which created it, and together with the director 
of the Department of Registration, have misapplied the law, and 
the evidence, in violation of the Plaintiff's constitutional 
rights afforded by the protections of due process of law, having 
revoked the license of this eminently qualified physician; to 
practice medicine, based on standards never before established, 
in total contravention of the standards recognized and testified 
to by the Doctors own peers in the practice of preventative 
medicine. The Appellant respectfully urges the Court to reverse 
the revocation action of the Department of Registration 
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(erroneously affirmed by the District Court) and restore the 
Appellant's license to practice osteopathic medicine in the 
State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of March, 1982. 
M. RICHARD WALKER 
KIRKPATR CK W. DILL! 
Attorney's for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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